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Mr. Rajan: Mr. Feldstein, you offered an explanation for our paper. I
didn’t know if you thought there was a difference between your expla-
nation and ours. I thought they were the same. We are suggesting that
one explanation is that savings are endogenous to growth. Therefore,
you could get a situation where you have countries that are successful
not relying on foreign capital. That does still leave the question, Why
aren’t they investing more when they have this growth spurt? That is
where we related it to the possibility that they can’t absorb so much
because the financial systems are not adequate. But in no way did that
suggest that foreign capital is a bad thing. It was just that it didn’t accom-
pany growth in that situation. So, your point is absolutely well-taken.
In that vein, it also would suggest why industrial countries seem to be
able to grow while absorbing foreign savings, while poorer countries
don’t seem to. It may be a difference in the institutional structures that
is causing that difference. 
Mr. Redrado: Following Arminio Fraga’s comments, I would like to
point out that one of the critical elements in Latin America and in
emerging markets is the lack of structural reforms in the financial
system. In particular, let me bring up two key areas. One is the exposure




355limits on its exposure to the government. And the second one is the
currency mismatches faced by many dollarized economies. Let me
dwell very briefly upon these two subjects.
First, in order to build a monetary and financial system that is inde-
pendent from public sector needs, specific and explicit caps must be
set up. In addition, increasing minimum capital requirements for the
holding of sovereign bonds of emerging markets based upon the juris-
diction of the public sector (federal, state, local) to properly reflect the
associated risks is a critical element. And these are significant regula-
tory changes that we have recently introduced in my own country. As
a consequence, the exposure of the financial system to public sector
assets as a share of total assets was cut in half, and has therefore
allowed for a crowding-in of the private sector. This kind of policy
tool that curtails the ability of governments to utilize the central bank
or the financial sector as a financing source is quite meaningful in
terms of achieving additional degrees of freedom for both monetary
and financial policy. This factor is crucial in Latin America, where
excessive financing to the government has historically crowded out
credit to the private sector.
Second, currency mismatches in highly dollarized economies have
always been a risk factor for the financial system in Latin America.
Therefore, a fundamental challenge is how to reduce the asset-liabil-
ity gap. In Argentina, prudential regulation is now in place to provide
incentives for banks to lend in domestic currency to firms and house-
holds that generate income in pesos and to have foreign exchange
deposits only applied to financing those who are able to generate
income in foreign currency. Many countries in Latin America have
started to pursue these kinds of policies, which not only are sound,
but also provide resilience to external vulnerabilities. 
Mr. Crockett: If the organizers of this conference had uncharacter-
istically invited Al Gore to participate, I am sure he would have found
some way to relate some of the themes to his “Inconvenient Truths.”
I wanted to ask whether the panel thinks he would have had some
justification in doing so or whether it would be irrelevant.
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 We have talked about the very rapid growth in the past and
projected growth for the next 30 years in countries that represent a
very large part of the world population. That is going to result in
enormous competition for natural resources. It is going to result in
more pollution? And it is going to result, as he would point out, I am
sure, in global warming? 
What is the relationship between that and economic geography?
What problems does that create for the sustainability of the kind of
policies and trends that we are talking about now? Is this an issue
perhaps for a future conference that economic policy ought to be
interested in, or is it something that we should regard as being dealt
with by others who have to look at these issues and not particularly
relevant for either economic or monetary policy? 
Mr. Berner: For the panel, and for Marty Feldstein in particular,
two questions on imbalances. The first is, Could you envision other
scenarios for the adjustment of global imbalances, for example, some-
what faster growth in the rest of the world, resulting in a contribution
to U.S. growth from net exports? It might have a more benign
outcome than the two you described.
The second question is for the panel more broadly: Are there possi-
ble changes in multilateral institutions and their architecture that
could conceivably speed the process or make the adjustment process
move more smoothly to reduce global imbalances and the effect on
exchange rates? 
Mr. Srinivasan: This is a question to Marty, drawing upon what
Rakesh Mohan said in his remarks. In most of the discussion and
your discussion also, the focus had been on a global imbalance adjust-
ment that is on the gross domestic product (GDP) side, consumption
savings side, interest rates, or exchange rates. It seems to me you have
to break down the demand side, not only with consumption and
investment, but also within investment. What is the composition of
investment? Within consumption, what is going to be the impact on
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 composition of consumption, particularly between tradable goods
and nontradable goods? That is point number one.
Point number two is to review what is happening in globalization, not
simply as a proportion of GDP rising everywhere, but also what were
previously nontradable and becoming much more tradable now? The
share of nontradable will be strictly defined into the GDP side, and the
demand sides are also changing. This is another source of adjustment.
The third thing: It is not very clear, when one is talking about adjust-
ment of global imbalances, whether one is talking about some
equilibrium that is out there. Right now, we are not there, and this is a
process of adjustment toward that equilibrium. Because of all the
exogenous effects of globalization, etc., that are out there, the equilib-
rium itself is shifting. To what extent does the adjustment have to
reflect not only the disequilibrium effect, but also the shift of equilib-
rium over time? Once you have broadened the means of adjustment,
then the impact on a single element in the adjustment—whether it is
GDP or whether it is consumption or whether it is an exchange rate—
will be to that extent less. Are we exaggerating the exchange rate impact
of GDP by ignoring various other elements of adjustment that could
also be useful in bringing about the part which is tracking the chang-
ing equilibria much better?
Mr. Feldstein: Raghu Rajan and I agree. It is really a matter of
emphasis on what you said within the paper itself. As you revise it, if
there is time, it would be useful to look at the role of FDI coming
into countries as a form that doesn’t depend on the sophistication of
the financial markets.
Andrew Crockett raised the question of what might have been said
about pollution in this conference. Obviously many, many things could
have been said, especially by somebody more expert about the subject
than I am. One distinction that would be worth making is between local
pollution—the kind of pollution that we associate with local water
supply or other pollution that stays within a country, like SO2 from
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 global pollution that comes from CO2. That is a global problem in the
sense that the creation of CO2 anywhere in the world within a year finds
its way into the atmosphere and adds to the global warming problem.
Some of those problems can be treated in a strictly local way; others can
be treated only by some kind of international coordination.
Dick Berner asked about the potential favorable effects of faster
growth in the rest of the world on shrinking the U.S. current account
imbalance. It is just too small. Do the arithmetic. Let’s imagine
adding 1 percentage point to the growth rate and look out five, six,
10 years even to the higher level of GDP that results. Apply to it an
import factor. Break that down between the United States and else-
where, and you don’t make a very big dent on the size of the U.S.
current account.
Mr. Srinivasan, I think you are absolutely right. There are both the
overall question of getting the savings rate up in the United States and
the composition. You cannot reduce the trade deficit without increas-
ing saving minus investment, so savings has to rise, but that is not
automatically going to convert itself into a reduction in the trade
deficit. For that, we require a change in the mix of what American
consumers consume, consuming less in the way of imports and more
of domestically produced goods and services. We are not going to
produce Chinese-style products in the United States. What has to
happen is a change in the relative cost of imported products, not just
Chinese imports (half of our imports come from high-wage coun-
tries), and a change in the relative cost of imported products and in
domestic consumption, which includes in large part services. That
requires a change in the exchange rate.
Mr. Fraga: There is one question left from Dick on whether
changes in multilateral institutions could help deal with imbalances.
Perhaps, but as of today, I am skeptical that would be the case. The
multilateral institutions are mainly designed to deal with problems in
the developing countries. The larger countries don’t seem to be
willing to give up their independence.
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 What would probably help were we to have a problem driven by
some accident, some war, or exuberantly negative market dynamics of
some sort or another—and I am not predicting that (I am leaning
toward a softer landing than anything else)—would be that the G-7
would get together and invite China, and maybe they could work
something out. My prediction there is that China would play a
constructive role, as they seem to playing these days 
Mr. Mohan: I want to respond to the question from Andrew
Crockett on the sustainability issue. Obviously I can’t do it justice in
just one minute. There is only one silver lining in the efficiency and
usage of both oil and other materials. What is interesting is that
between 1970 and now, the oil intensity usage, that is, say, kilograms
of oil per real used per input worldwide, has come down from 0.18
to 0.11. The efficacy of the price mechanism goes to show that the
United States has come down from 0.19 to 0.09. At the same time,
the United Kingdom and Japan have come down to 0.05, that is, the
United States is about twice as inefficient as the United Kingdom and
Japan, which seem to be on the frontier. But developing countries are
four times as inefficient as the United Kingdom and Japan. That is,
India and China are around 0.20, compared with 0.05 for the United
Kingdom and Japan. In terms of these kinds of numbers, there is a
long way for us to go in terms of efficiency with oil usage. Maybe that
also applies to other materials. As prices go up, usually these types of
changes will take place. The point you brought up still bothers me
when I look at these kinds of numbers: Can it really happen that a
billion and a half people go marching forward the next 30 years with
the kind of development we have seen over the last 50 years? 
360 Chair: Erkki Liikanen
 